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Humanist Discussion Group, Vol. 34, No. 218. Department of Digital Humanities, King's College London Hosted by King's Digital Lab www.dhhumanist.org Submit to: humanist@dhhumanist.org [1] From: Mark WolffSubject: Re: [Humanist] 34.216: on GPT-3 (41) [2] From: Gabriel Egan Subject: Re: [Humanist] 34.216: on GPT-3 (33) [3] From: Jim Rovira Subject: Re: [Humanist] 34.216: on GPT-3 (38) --[1]------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: 2020-08-07 19:45:45+00:00 From: Mark Wolff Subject: Re: [Humanist] 34.216: on GPT-3 On Aug 7, 2020, at 2:41 AM, Humanist wrote: > Ferdinand de Saussure's famous structuralist model of language is also > relational, but it is heterogeneous: all signifiers -- "sound images" for > Saussure -- are of the same kind, and within the homogeneous set of signifiers > -- all of them "sound images" --, each signifier is defined precisely by being > different from all others. The same holds for all signifieds, concepts for > Saussure. A sign is formed when a signifier is connected to a signified -- a > sound image to a concept -- and thus when *categorically different* units, each > defined differentially within its own homogeneous system, are brought together. > Signification arises out of a *heterogeneous* system. > (1) What happens when a large machine learning algorithm is fed two or more > _different_ sets of inputs with the model tasked to build not one (as GPT-3), > but two or more homogeneous relational systems which are categorically different > from each other, and to connect them together, creating relationships between > heterogeneous units and thus a structure of signification? This is an interesting way to frame the question. The relationships between signifiers can be mapped using neural networks and the relationships between signifieds can be mapped using topic modeling. These are different approaches to machine learning and therefore could, if combined, instantiate a heterogeneous system for signification. mw -- Mark B. Wolff, Ph.D. Professor of French Chair, Modern Languages One Hartwick Drive Hartwick College Oneonta, NY 13820 (607) 431-4615 http://markwolff.name/ --[2]------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: 2020-08-07 10:21:27+00:00 From: Gabriel Egan Subject: Re: [Humanist] 34.216: on GPT-3 Dear HUMANISTs Brigitte Rath wrote: > Within GPT-3, words only ever connect to other > words, they cannot connect to concepts or objects The proof that GPT-3 does indeed encode concepts and can use them in something like reasoning is surely its performance at arithmetic. It is not surprising that if you enter the string "2 + 2 =" into GPT-3 it responds with the string "4", since as an answer to the question "what comes next?" the "4" is predictable because the training data doubtless contains some examples of the string "2 + 2 = 4". But you if enter into GPT-3 a three-digit addition or subtraction such as "543 + 298 =" the correct answer (in this case "841") comes back about 80-90% of the time. These results are not the effect of the model memorizing all the possible sums in its dataset -- demonstrably, these sums are not present in the training data -- but rather the result of the model embodying the principles of arithmetic, including place-value and carrying-out. This, surely, qualifies as the encoding of concepts. Regards Gabriel Egan --[3]------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: 2020-08-07 13:47:17+00:00 From: Jim Rovira Subject: Re: [Humanist] 34.216: on GPT-3 Willard -- Does the word mimesis apply to machine activity? Imitation is a function of consciousness. Calling machine behavior mimesis answers the question ahead of time; it's a kind of question begging. Aristotelian mimesis referred to the creation of art forms (poetry, music, dance, art) by conscious beings. We can only begin to talk about machines engaging in mimesis when they imitate observed activity outside of their programming, and when the imitation isn't rote but creative: a kind of interpretation or re-presentation of an object or being that shows us not only the object but communicates a person's understanding or experience of the object. So a camera might produce an image, but the image doesn't communicate the camera's individual experience of the object captured on film. I think questions about consciousness are eminently worth asking, but I think they can only be asked of organic beings. I think we need different words to discuss machines: maybe processing? The act of executing a program? Brigitte -- Very interesting bringing Saussure into this discussion. About this question: "What happens when a large machine learning algorithm is fed two or more _different_ sets of inputs with the model tasked to build not one (as GPT-3)..." Do machines ever receive more than one different kind of input? It's all code, isn't it? Voice commands are code, keyboard input is code, RFID is code, and it's all the same kind of code: the language with which the machine is programmed. I don't think the human brain processes vision the same way it processes sound or touch (although it occurs to me I don't know), so we can say that our brains have different inputs and outputs, but do computers? Jim R _______________________________________________ Unsubscribe at: http://dhhumanist.org/Restricted List posts to: humanist@dhhumanist.org List info and archives at at: http://dhhumanist.org Listmember interface at: http://dhhumanist.org/Restricted/ Subscribe at: http://dhhumanist.org/membership_form.php
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